

Comparison of Mediterranean and Ukrainian Migration Impacts on V4 Countries

Rastislav Čief¹, Artur Boháč²

<https://doi.org/10.25167/brs4559>

Submitted: 24 Oct 2021; Revised: 16 Feb 2022 Resubmitted: 12 Jul 2023; Accepted: 15 Apr 2024;

Published: 12 Aug 2024

Abstract:

Today's Europe still resonates with the migration crisis connected with the arrival of migrants from Africa and Asia. Despite its massive impact on Central Europe, the significant migratory flow from Ukraine avoids considerable media attention. This article compares the effect of the Mediterranean migration and Ukrainian migration on V4 countries before the Covid-19 pandemic. There is an significant disproportion in the volumes of the compared migratory flows favouring the Ukrainian migration. However, Mediterranean migration became a substantial issue in elections in particular V4 countries. Our analysis focuses on the causes of different perceptions of both migratory flows and their impacts on recipient countries at the social and foreign policy levels. According to our research, different perceptions of the flows by the people and politicians are connected to the level of immigrants' cultural and linguistic proximity and their potential integration. As the current situation suggests, the stabilisation of the political situation in Ukraine will take a more extended period, and the subsequent social and economic renewal will take another period. We assume the migratory flows from Ukraine will continue in the following years. Similarly, the Mediterranean migratory flows are likely to continue, probably with the shifts in their intensity, depending on their home countries' situation and the Schengen regulatory measures. All of the above-mentioned issues put pressure on recipient countries to create a long-term immigration strategy that would enable them to manage the migration flow-related problems without societal destabilisation. The submitted interdisciplinary article uses the theoretical basis of migration studies (immigration policies, push and pull factors) and international relations (neorealism). The methodology of the text is anchored in the analysis of the relevant literature and statistical sources. The title of the article suggests the use of the comparison method.

Keywords:

Mediterranean migration, Ukrainian migration, V4 countries, migration perception, migration impacts

Citation (APA):

Čief, R., Boháč, A. (2024). Comparison of Mediterranean and Ukrainian Migration Impacts on V4 Countries. *Border and Regional Studies*, 12,1, 35-70.

1 Rastislav Čief, Ph.D. – Assistant Professor at the Department of Geography, Catholic University in Ružomberok, Slovakia; e-mail: rastislav.cief@ku.sk

2 Artur Boháč, Ph.D. (ORCID 0000-0001-6238-7472) – Assistant Professor at the Department of Geography, Technical University of Liberec, Czech Republic; e-mail: artur.bohac@tul.cz

Introduction

We live in a globalised world where one region's events dynamically affect others. The interaction among particular areas has many different levels that are mutually intertwined but often have opposing impacts. In today's Europe, the migration crisis resonates with mostly unauthorised entries of immigrants from Northern Africa and Western Asia. The conflicts created by the migration crisis are so profound that they can play a vital role in the social cohesion and well-being in Europe and the further development of European integration. However, a significant (primarily economic) migration flow from Ukraine receives small public coverage despite its considerable impact on Central Europe and regular contact with Ukrainian people in larger Central European cities, which are attractive for Ukrainian migrants because of their job opportunities. The Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian war on Ukraine have become the most pressing problem in Europe, significantly affecting migration issues. Nevertheless, we finished our text in 2020, and the relationship between the pandemic or war and migration is another topic deserving a particular study.

This article compares the impacts of Mediterranean migration (migration from MENA countries – the Middle East and Northern Africa) and Ukrainian migration on the V4 countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary). We focus primarily on the individual members of the V4 because the group's activities on the level of ministers or prime ministers are usually held twice a year. Though, the V4 common opinions and actions cannot be omitted. Also, the attitudes among citizens of these countries are considered. The Visegrad group was formed in 1991 as a group of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, also known as the Visegrád Triangle. Following the disintegration of Czechoslovakia in 1993, both successor countries became members of this group, known as the Visegrad Four (V4). The common goal of the V4 countries was to integrate into European and transatlantic structures, while the group's activities were aimed at mutual support in meeting these goals. The group was based on geographical, economic and cultural proximity (Nič 2016; Braun 2019). After joining the EU in 2004, the intensity of the V4 countries' cooperation slackened.

A significant recovery of the V4 cooperation was seen after the outbreak of the migration crisis, especially in sharing the common opposition views to mandatory quotas for the redistribution of migrants from the EU countries most affected by Mediterranean migration, such as Italy and Greece. The disagreement was evident from the V4 joint statements, declarations (Visegrad Group 2023), and individual representatives' statements. The Czech Republic has no external land borders, but Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have non-EU neighbours. All V4

countries can be considered ethnically homogeneous. The migration crisis showed the incoherency of the EU. Electional results and preference for liberal and globalist or conservative and nationalist political parties in the V4 countries determine their policies and form the attitudes of the whole V4. Generally, we can observe robust ties between Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which have historical traditions of cooperation. These ties are also reflected by the V4 citizens (Nézöpont intézet 2018). The position of conservative and nationalist political forces in Hungary and Poland is more potent than in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where the situation is more changeable and oscillates between the EU liberal and regional national-conservative narrative. While the stances within the V4 were not always consistent despite the existence of joint documents, the four countries successfully projected a united front externally.

When comparing Mediterranean and Ukrainian migration into the V4 countries, we find a significant disproportion in the volumes of the compared migration flows favouring Ukrainian migration, which is an interesting phenomenon. In contrast to the volumes of migration flows, the Mediterranean migration dominates the public, media and political scene. The authors realise that the mentioned migrations are partly typologically different, but their attention is incommensurable. Mediterranean migration became an influential topic in election campaigns and election results in particular V4 countries. It has also influenced the development of the foreign relations of the V4 countries with the Western European countries³ which were informally led by Germany. Mediterranean migration peaked in 2015, and then the number of immigrants slowly fell (Gruszczak 2018). However, the problem is not fully solved yet. Migrants keep coming, and there is no common European solution.

We are aware that our study focuses predominantly on the state and macroregional levels, which brings several generalisations of the complex issue of mass migration. We work with the primary hypothesis that culturally and linguistically close migrants, especially in the first generation, integrate more readily into a host society (structurally, culturally, socially, politically, and civically) (Heath, Schneider 2021). The question of immigrant integration influences the attitudes of the public and several political subjects relevant to a state's foreign policy. The cultural distance can lead to obstacles between migrants and host societies. It can lead to misunderstanding of the majority's thinking and vice versa. The degree of prejudice in a host state also varies according to the nationality and ethnicity of foreigners. Culturally and linguistically closer migrants face fewer prejudices

³ The countries of Western Europe are referred to rather from a political than geographical point of view, including the South-Western and Northern Europe.

than culturally different and more distant groups (Průcha 2010). Immigration perceived as a burden or threat may lead to the securitisation of the whole question and its use by politicians (Brader, Valentino, Suhay 2008). We aim to answer the main research question: What are the differences between the impacts of the Mediterranean and Ukrainian migration on the V4 countries? Concretely, we focus on the type of migrants, their numbers, and their impacts on recipient countries at social, economic, domestic and foreign policy levels. We also focus on the causes of different perceptions and discourses of migration flows by analysing available public opinion monitoring.

Theoretical and methodological background

Migration is a multi-layered phenomenon studied by geography, economy, political science, international relations, sociology, history and many other sciences included under interdisciplinary migration studies. Numerous studies deal with Mediterranean migration and its wider socio-politics and economics (Pallister-Wilkins 2016; Panebianco 2016; Gruszczak 2017; Campesi 2018). Ukrainian migration is also studied intensively, although not as frequently and loudly as the Mediterranean (Drbohlav, Jaroszewicz ed. 2016; Fedyuk, Kindler 2016; Van Mol et al. 2018). Studies about European states' migration policy, especially V4, are also remarkable (Szalai, Csornai, Galai 2017; Bauerová 2018; Cesarz 2019). Nevertheless, few studies the two streams of migration mentioned in the last years and their impacts on European countries, particularly V4 countries and their politics and society.

Migration is a central issue for scholars and politicians who usually attempt to decrease or increase immigration or emigration. The basic model for studying migration considers push and pull factors of different significance, which typically merge and create driver complexes (Van Hear, Bakewell, Long 2017). These driver complexes make people decide to migrate or to stay, and they also lead to the perpetuation of the movement. They can be applied to complex migration streams, such as the Mediterranean and Ukrainian, that feature both voluntary and forced migration. Push and pull factors are based on economic, political and environmental disparities between the home country and potential host country were criticised as too simplistic and deterministic (de Haas 2010). The authors find these factors relevant. However, an explanatory system including micro and mesolevels of social networks and transmigration is needed for analysis. Considering the topic of the text, it is focused on the pull factors. The main pull factors in destination places are economic growth connected with higher salaries and social benefits, societal improvement, educational opportunities or liberal

immigration policy. Several mediating factors such as geographic proximity, cultural and linguistic proximity, possibilities of transport, information about the journey or presence of a relative in a destination country can also be included among pull factors.

A potential host country's type of immigration and integration policy is one of the pillars of the migrant's option. We can distinguish the general style of states' immigration policy, which develops specific approaches towards immigration as cross-border flow and integration policy as an accommodation of immigrants in the majority society. However, specific situational circumstances can reshape the mentioned styles, especially in immigration policy (Freeman 2006). Immigration policy consists of rules and procedures for foreign citizens' selection and admission. Generally, we can distinguish between open and restrictive immigration policies. Then, we can trace the specific policies towards various types of migrants (UN 2013). We can observe paradigm shifts and related clashes between different attitudes to immigration policy in the EU concerning Mediterranean migration. A massive breach of the Dublin Regulation, the European integrated border management system and relocation plans of the immigrants known as Dublin IV changed the situation. Integration policies are developed to address the needs of foreigners arising from their cultural and social distinctions and expected language problems (UN 2013). The integration models (discriminatory, assimilation and multicultural) adopted by European countries have undergone significant challenges since the late 1990s, shaping their individual trajectories. Consequently, making direct and sweeping comparisons between the two major paradigms has become challenging. One paradigm emphasises the rejection of all differentiation, while the other promotes it. A liberal shift occurred in Europe in the early 21st century as the traditional models of integration policies were perceived as obstacles to immigrant integration (Kymlicka 2018).

We recognise various international migrants: guest workers, family members, asylum seekers, illegal migrants and stateless persons. Guest workers can be divided into immigrants with long-term work permits and immigrants with seasonal work permits. Each state has its specific terminology and rules connected with guest workers. It is often challenging to distinguish economic migrants and humanitarian refugees among asylum seekers from economic migrants, and nowadays, in the EU, even illegal migrants are received. An explanation of main terms connected with migration and the asylum process is needed. Refugees are persons fleeing war or persecution and searching for a haven in a host country (Cesarz 2019). They include individuals recognised under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva Convention); its 1967 Protocol; the 1969

OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; those recognised under the UNHCR Statute; individuals granted complementary forms of protection; or those enjoying temporary shelter. Since 2007, the refugee population has also included people in a refugee-like situation.

While not every asylum seeker is granted recognition as a refugee, all individuals acknowledged as refugees initially hold asylum seeker status. Refugees cannot return to their home country until the situation stabilises and becomes safe. Asylum-seekers are individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined, irrespective of when they may have been lodged. Asylum is granted to a foreigner who is persecuted in his home country because of race, ethnicity, religion, political views or membership in a particular social group. Asylum can be granted to relatives of such a person. Asylum is given indefinitely and means permanent residence, access to the labour market, healthcare and welfare system, education, etc. Subsidiary protection is a mechanism for unsuccessful asylum seekers afraid to return to their home country. Subsidiary protection can be granted to relatives of these persons. Subsidiary protection means temporary residence. It is given for one year, but it can be prolonged repeatedly. Access to public services for people with subsidiary protection is limited. Humanitarian protection (permission to remain) is a form of legalisation of stay with limited access to public services in case there is no possibility of deportation or return (V4NIEM 2019).

The principle of non-refoulement applies to all protection determinations. It signifies that individuals should not be sent back to a country where they would be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, and any other irreparable harm. Illegal migrants are foreign people living in a country without having official permission to live there. Illegal migrants are usually attracted to destinations of economic opportunities and intend to search for irregular or illegal work there. Stateless persons are defined under international law as persons who are not considered nationals by any state under the operation of its law. In other words, they do not possess the nationality of any state. UNHCR statistics refer to persons who fall under the agency's statelessness mandate because they are stateless according to this international definition. Still, data from some countries may also include persons with undetermined nationality.

Others of concern refer to individuals who do not necessarily fall directly into any of the groups above but to whom UNHCR extends its protection and assistance services based on humanitarian or other exceptional grounds (UNHCR 2020). V4NIEM (Visegrad Countries National Integration Evaluation Mechanism Report) in its report (V4NIEM 2019) works with terms asylum seekers and BIPs

(beneficiaries of international protection, including people with refugee status, subsidiary protection or humanitarian protection). V4 countries' immigration policies work with the concepts mentioned earlier, but there are differences in several nuances (see Soltész ed. 2021) that are not the subject of this paper.

The perception of immigration varies from enthusiastically positive to strictly negative. Globalists and (neo)liberals promote a humanitarian aspect of open borders and praise immigration as cultural enrichment and an opportunity to help a society's demographic structure and economy. Localist, nationalist and conservative groups typically advocate strict (external) border controls and portray immigration as a security and identity threat and economic onus (Pallister-Wilkins 2016; Panebianco 2016). The above-mentioned attitudes are supplemented in practice by positive or negative experiences with immigrants' integration. Special attention from critics of mass immigration is paid to the controversies of the religion of Islam because a high percentage of immigrants are Muslims (Bauerová 2018; Naxera, Krčál 2018). Security is a vital political concept that can mobilise voters (Bourbeau 2011). The migration crisis is commented on by almost all, even marginal, political parties in Europe. It brought or deepened divisions in the societies of the EU, particularly V4 countries.

Migration is an international phenomenon to which states respond as it challenges their control over borders and territory. Modern massive migration is strongly connected to globalisation. Nevertheless, state or integration (EU) geopolitical considerations still shape its forms and volume and decide the permeability of its borders. They can use people flows for geostrategic gains (Parkes 2015). Immigrants may epitomise a threat in social, economic and even political senses (Hollifield 1992). In the 21st century, it has become a securitised topic and may be perceived as an aspect of geopolitical rivalry. In evaluating the V4 countries' politics, the authors view it from the standpoint of neorealism as a theory of international relations (Zogata-Kusz 2012). Neorealism considers state interests and the settings of the global system essential and brings a broader concept of security (Mearsheimer 2014).

Originally, migration was a marginal topic for the neorealist paradigm, but the question became essential and securitised after terrorist attacks in the West at the start of the new millennium. A crisis may be seen as an intra-European political struggle of pragmatically cooperating V4 countries and core countries of the EU. Also, their influence in EU studies remains limited. This mutual neglect stems from neorealism's perspective, which regards the EU as a secondary phenomenon in global politics. Nevertheless, given the ongoing crises within the EU, there is a possibility that neorealist perspectives could see an unexpected

resurgence, particularly as theories explaining disintegration. This resurgence is attributed to neorealism's inherent scepticism toward long-lasting, institutionalised forms of cooperation within the international system (Zimmermann 2021). These circumstances and geographical locations affect how studied governments perceive mass migration.

The text deals with a multi-layered phenomenon that determines its interdisciplinarity and a certain level of generalisation. It is based on the analysis of relevant literature, statistics, and experiences of the authors who have deep personal knowledge of the V4 countries. Contemporary topics include the attention to media outlets. Political proclamations and documents are also studied as relevant sources of information. It uses the comparison method, e.g., comparing the impact of Mediterranean and Ukrainian migration in V4 countries through demographic and economic statistics analysis reflected in the text as graphic and tabular additions.

Mediterranean migration to the V4 countries

Mediterranean migration started at the end of 2014. It comprises migration flows from Africa by crossing the Mediterranean Sea and flows from South-Western Asia, following the Balkan route⁴. Another important migration flow to the V4 countries comes from the Caucasus, Central, Southern, and Eastern Asia, crossing the eastern V4 border. Following the destabilisation of Libya and Syria, the migration flows from Africa and Asia to Europe increased significantly and were connected with a high percentage of illegal border crossings. The peak of the crisis was in 2015. Since 2016, we have observed a decline in the number of migrants due to the implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement, which was supported by the V4 countries.

The rising influx of migrants in Europe has led to a proportional increase in the number of asylum applications, signifying requests for international protection filed within European countries. As per Regulation (EC) 862/2007, the international protection procedures within EU member states can result in various outcomes. The asylum claim may be either accepted or rejected, leading to the grant of different statuses: refugee status (in accordance with the Geneva Convention 1951), subsidiary protection status, authorisation to stay for humanitarian reasons based on national laws related to international protection, or temporary protection status under EU legislation. Notably, humanitarian protection, also known as the

4 Mediterranean migration, its routes, source countries and numbers of migrants are clearly depicted in the article written by Torelli (2018).

so-called humanitarian status, lacks harmonisation at the EU level and may not be reported to the EU by all member states (EASO 2015). Firstly, the EU acted impulsively and without internal consensus. It did not comply with its own rules on migrant registration, asylum procedures and the protection of its external borders. The exceptional case was Germany with its open-door immigration policy.

The distribution of Mediterranean migration wave to European countries was disproportionate, while the V4 countries have been affected only to a minimum extent, except for Hungary as a transitory country which since 2015 constructed a fence on its border with Serbia and later with other southern neighbours. However, the EU, especially the European Commission, declared the European Agenda on Migration, promoting shared responsibility between member states through quotas imposed in 2015. A qualified majority approved the quota system in the Council of the EU despite the opposition of V4 states.

The shared allocation criteria for both the EU resettlement plans outlined in the agenda were based on measurable and weighted factors to assess each state's capability to accommodate refugees. These factors included population size to represent a state's capacity to absorb a specific number of refugees, total GDP to indicate the overall wealth of a state and its economic ability to absorb and integrate refugees, the average number of asylum applications and resettled refugees per 1 million inhabitants in 2010–2014 to signify a state's recent efforts, and the unemployment rate to demonstrate a state's capacity to integrate refugees (Pachocka 2016). Under the criteria established and approved for determining quotas among EU member states, the V4 countries were designated to accept around 12 000 refugees from Greece and Italy. Specifically, the allocated quotas were as follows: Czech Republic – 2 691, Hungary – 1 294, Poland – 7 082, and Slovakia – 902 (Fiala, Krutílek, Pitrová 2018).

The V4 countries rejected the system of quotas as a violation of state sovereignty and did not comply with it. The Czech Republic's dissenting stance stemmed from reservations about the effectiveness of the relocation mechanism, which relied on a unilateral evaluation of the respective state. In the instances of Hungary and Poland, the temporary resettlement of refugees was declined under Article 72 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, citing apprehensions related to public order and threats to national security. Instead of quotas, the V4 countries offered support for military actions against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, humanitarian help and support for detention centres (hotspots) for migrants outside the Schengen Zone in the Balkan peninsula, Libya or even Sahel countries⁵.

5 Nevertheless, hundreds of Iraqi Christians were accepted by V4 countries, but some of

They also promoted strengthening external EU borders and changes in Frontex's competencies. This approach was criticised by the Western European core⁶ of the EU and also condemned by the Court of Justice of the EU. Even sanctions for the EU members refusing to accept redistributed migrants were considered (Duszczuk, Podgórska, Pszczółkowska 2019). The attitude of the V4 countries was a bit changeable with the changes in political representation, but general opposition against quotas persisted. Individual V4 political representations also opposed the UN Global Compact for Migration, which shares liberal perspectives of the EU (Szalai, Csornai, Galai 2017; Bauerová 2018).

The EU retreated from its positions over time, but EU's efforts at immigrant redistribution are still actual and hidden in various forms. The main reason for the disproportion mentioned above can be seen in the economic situation of the V4 countries, which are significantly economically lagging behind European countries. The V4 countries' GDP per capita in 2019 ranged from 32 945 USD to 40 862 USD, while Germany reached 53 919 USD (CIA 2020) (see Figure 1). Moreover, the difference in salaries is more prominent. Because of this pull factor, the V4 countries are not attractive to migrants since social security is adequate for the country's economic power. Mediterranean migrants use the V4 countries only as transit countries in the Schengen system. The number of beneficiaries of international protection in the V4 countries was hundreds to lower thousands in 2018, and the most frequent Mediterranean nationalities of newly granted beneficiaries were Afghan, Syrian, Iraqi and Yemeni (V4NIEM 2019). The national structures of asylum seekers were similar. Generally, we saw a greater relative share of Mediterranean migrants in Hungary and Slovakia, which are closer to the Balkan migration route. Poland and the Czech Republic were dominated by asylum seekers from the post-Soviet space, especially Ukraine and Russia.

Their destination countries are economically strong countries of Western Europe, especially Germany, which promoted an open-door migration policy. Even migrants who are detained or apply for asylum in the V4 countries go further west to their planned destination countries at the earliest opportunity. Another reason for Mediterranean migrants' disinterest in the V4 countries is the virtual absence of communities and social networks from their home environment that could help them adapt to a foreign environment. This absence of migrants' networks, connected with sharing information and remittances, is also related to the lack of the colonial history of the V4 countries. V4 countries are quite ethnically

them moved back to Iraq or emigrated to Germany and other Western European states (Reuters 2016).

6 There are exceptions such as Austria which recently shares similar stance as V4 countries.

homogeneous, without minorities over 10% of the population. A language barrier should also be considered, as Slavic languages and Hungarian are practically not spoken by any Mediterranean migrants. Moreover, a non-negligible share of them does not understand the Latin alphabet (Brücker et al. 2019). Therefore, costly long-term education for those who are interested is needed. It is worth noting that not all migrants are interested in language courses or even getting a job (Janusek-Krysińska, Majewski 2016).




Figure 1: The comparison of GDP per capita (USD \$) in the V4 and selected Western European countries in 2019

Source: Statistics Times 2020

As a result of these causes, Mediterranean migration played only a marginal role in the everyday reality of V4 countries (Table 1, 2, 3 and Figure 2). The only exception is Hungary, which was in 2015 hit by a transit flow from the Balkans to Austria and Germany (estimated numbers are more than 150 000). Hungary started immigrant registration (which should have already been done in Greece when entering the Schengen area) (Campesi 2018).

Table 1: Number of asylum applications in the V4 countries since 2012

Country	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Poland	12190	12305	5045	4110	4070
Czech Republic	1515	1475	1445	1690	1915
Slovakia	330	145	1475	175	230
Hungary	177135	29430	3390	670	500

Source: UNHCR 2020

Table 2: Asylum decisions in the V4 countries in 2015

Country	Asylum applications	Total first instance decisions	Total first instance positive decisions (any form of protection)	Recognition rate (%)
Poland	12190	3510	640	18
Czech Republic	1515	1335	460	34
Slovakia	330	130	80	62
Hungary	177135	3420	505	15
EU28	1321600	592845	307620	52

Source: Pachocka 2016

Table 3: Persons of concern in the V4 countries at the end of 2020

Country	Persons of concern	Refugees	Asylum-seekers	Stateless persons	Others
Poland	17415	12780	3307	1328	0
Czech Republic	5317	2126	1354	1397	440
Slovakia	2540	977	40	1523	0
Hungary	5965	5834	54	77	0

Source: UNHCR 2020

Generally, immigration in the V4 countries and common European migration policy are not perceived very positively regarding the average perception in the whole EU, as shown in data from the Eurobarometer 90 and previous Eurobarometers since 2015 (V4NIEM 2019). Immigration from the countries in the EU is not a big deal, but immigration from non-EU countries epitomises a problem (see Table 4). Paradoxically, the countries that politically strongly oppose Mediterranean migration have a higher percentage of positive views on immigration than the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where political denial of immigration is not so solid and stable. The relatively positive outlook on immigration in Poland might be attributed to the Ukrainians contributing to the growing Polish economy. The statistics of granted international protection in the V4 countries and the EU documents openness towards immigration (see Table 2).




Figure 2: Persons of concern in the V4 countries at the end of 2020

Source: UNHCR 2020

Table 4: Feelings towards the immigration of people from the non-EU countries in 2019

Country	Very negative (%)	Fairly negative (%)	Fairly positive (%)	Very positive (%)
Poland	21	43	22	5
Czech Republic	49	37	9	1
Slovakia	35	49	10	3
Hungary	47	28	15	6

Source: V4NIEM 2019

In contrast to the EU level, none of the Visegrad states primarily granted refugee status as the primary form of international protection. Hungary had the highest percentage of people receiving refugee status (47% of all positive decisions), followed by Poland (36%) and the Czech Republic (20%), while no individuals were granted refugee status in Slovakia. In the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, the majority of applicants were awarded subsidiary protection, typically provided in situations of widespread violence in the country of origin. The percentages were 76%, 56%, and 49%, respectively. In Poland, the highest number of applicants were given humanitarian protection (41%) (Pachocka 2016).

Ukrainian migration to the V4 countries

New Ukraine was established in 1991 by declaring independence from the collapsing Soviet Union. In the nineties of the twentieth century, the Ukrainian transformation from a centrally planned economy to a market economy began. The period of economic transformation induced several changes: the changes in ownership relations (the creation of the oligarch society class) and a long-term decline in the performance of the Ukrainian economy (economic growth was observed only in 2000). The economic decline was subsequently reflected in the Ukrainian population processes. Fertility fell from 1 776 in 1991 to 1 078 in 2001, followed by a slight increase to 1 442 in 2019 (The World Bank 2019). Economic emigration was the second negative phenomenon affecting population development, the most significant emigration wave from post-Soviet space to the EU.

According to the State Statistics Service Ukraine, Ukraine had a negative net migration compared to foreign countries in 2004. Net migration has been positive since 2005. These data on foreign migration provided by the State Statistics Service Ukraine seem entirely unrealistic, considering that the migrants do not report the change in their permanent residence. The unreliability of these data can also be seen in the analysis of the Ukrainian population development, where the decrease of the population in the years 1993-2017 could not be caused only by natural migration. According to the State Statistics Service Ukraine, in 1993, Ukraine had 52 440 100 inhabitants, and in 2019, only 44 386 203 (Figure 3), which means a loss of 8 million people (Apalkova, Lyzunova 2019). More than ten million Ukrainians work abroad (Strielkowski, Sanderson 2013).

Several aspects of pre-2014 Ukrainian emigration indicate that individual characteristics play a significant role in shaping migration aspirations. Notably, the gender dynamics of Ukrainian migration exhibit distinct patterns, as highlighted by studies (Dietz 2010; Fedyuk, Kindler 2016). In the Czech Republic and Portugal, the majority of migrants are male, primarily employed in the agricultural and construction sectors. Conversely, migration from Ukraine to Italy and Slovakia is marked by a notable presence of female migrants, typically engaged in the care and domestic services sector (Dietz 2010). Current migration from Ukraine to the V4 countries continued the tradition of migration from the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy. The decline of the population in Ukraine can be compared to the rise of the Ukrainian population in the V4 countries, such as the Czech Republic (Figure 4).




Figure 3: The development of the population of Ukraine in 1993-2019

Source: State Statistics Service Ukraine 2017; The World Bank 2019




Figure 4: Ukrainians in the Czech Republic data quarterly 2004/06-2020/12

Source: Český statistický úřad 2020

In 2004, following the victory of the pro-Russian presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovich, the Orange Revolution broke out in Ukraine. A pro-Western candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, came to power in the repeat presidential election. Ukraine's division into pro-Western regions (West and North of Ukraine) and pro-Russian areas (East and South of Ukraine) began. The winner of the next

presidential election in 2010, Viktor Yanukovich, assumed the presidency. Even though Viktor Yanukovich was a pro-Russian candidate, he started the convergence with the EU while keeping a close relationship with Russia, with the vision of Ukraine as a bridge between the East and the West. This vision was not fulfilled when, in 2013, Viktor Yanukovich decided not to sign the anticipated Association Agreement with the EU. The reason for not signing the Association Agreement with the EU was an advantageous offer of economic assistance from Russia and the pressure of the EU to release a former Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, who in 2011 had been found guilty of abuse of authority for signing gas contracts with Russia. The reaction to not signing the association agreement with the EU was demonstrations in Kyiv at Maidan Square and other Ukrainian cities. Protests escalated into violence, making President Viktor Yanukovich flee his country and move to Russia on 22 February 2014 (Drbohlav, Jaroszewicz 2016).

The sharp decline in the population of Ukraine can be seen mainly between 2014 and 2015, when the conflict in eastern Ukraine escalated and when Ukrainians from the Donietsk and Luhansk Regions with self-proclaimed pro-Russian republics or Crimea became to be considered refugees and applied for asylum in European countries (Lendel 2016). These data show this is a significant emigration region whose population is literally in the exodus era. The Ukrainian emigration is spatially fragmented into a large part of Europe. However, emigration to neighbouring countries has increased compared to the pre-2014 situation (Harper 2018).

In 2019, there were 1 351 418 Ukrainians in Poland in, while 244 200 received work-residence permits (Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców 2020), 165 654 Ukrainians in the Czech Republic, while 29 207 received permits⁷ (Český statistický úřad 2020), 24 913 Ukrainians in Slovakia, while 10 584 received permits (Letavajová, Divinský 2019) and 24 197 Ukrainians in Hungary, while 21 793 received permits (Bisztrai, Kovács, Kováts, Vadasi 2020). Generally, the Muslim challenge prompted V4 countries to initiate a shift in their approach to migrants from Eastern Europe. Specifically, the Czech Republic government took a significant step by streamlining the process for professionals from Ukraine to acquire long-term work visas in 2015. Additionally, they expressed a willingness to welcome 500 highly skilled individuals with unique expertise. This change in policy can be attributed to the Czech economy's growth and a less favourable stance on migration from the MENA region. Hungary's government also followed suit,

7 Ukrainians prefer to work in Poland, where they will get a work permit in a shorter period of time. It takes about three weeks in Poland to process a permit in comparison to three months in the Czech Republic.

advocating for the acceptance of 100 000 Ukrainians as part of an arrangement to balance its refusal to accept Mediterranean migrants (Lendel 2016). As a result of military operations, 1 007 900 inhabitants had emigrated to other regions of Ukraine, and 268 400 had migrated abroad by the beginning of 2015 (UNHCR 2015). By the end of September 2015, 1 300 000 Ukrainians had fled to Russia, while 400 000 claimed refugee status, 300 000 claimed temporary residence, and 600 000 were unregistered (Weir 2015). Since June 2018, the Ukrainians have had a 90-day visa-free travel regime with the EU, which increases the migration options of the Ukrainian population in the coming period.




Figure 5: Persons of concern in Ukraine, end of 2020

Source: UNHCR 2020⁸

Social and political impacts of Mediterranean and Ukrainian Migration on the V4 Countries

A comprehensive assessment of migration's economic impacts is problematic when considering many variables and the complexity of the whole

⁸ Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are people or groups of individuals who have been forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights, or natural or man-made disasters, and who have not crossed an international border. For the purposes of UNHCR's statistics, this population only includes conflict-generated IDPs to whom the Office extends protection and assistance. Since 2007, the IDP population also includes people in an IDP-like situation.

process. The positive effects on the economy can be seen in the influx of cheap labour, allowing progressive development in some sectors of the economy, especially in the current period of economic growth. Many Ukrainian immigrants work mainly as construction, industrial and agricultural workers and provide currently absent services in the market. However, they also hold highly qualified positions, especially in the healthcare sector, where Ukrainian healthcare workers alleviate the consequences of unoccupied posts by domestic healthcare workers who have left the country for better offers in the West. The shortage of qualified labour is also linked to the demographic crisis in Europe. Over a more extended period, the total fertility has dropped below 2.1, which is the replacement level necessary to maintain the population in the original state (similar fertility in the V4 countries ranges from 1.44 to 1.71) (Eurostat 2020). From a long-term perspective, immigration contributes to covering the shortage of qualified labour.

Table 5: Employment and residence of foreigners by citizenship as of 31 December 2019 in the Czech Republic

Country	Employed foreigners, total	Registered at labour offices	Holding a valid trade licence	Residing foreigners, total
Ukraine	167038	121086	22924	311048
Vietnam	34668	12558	20733	67959
Turkey	1842	1647	195	3684

Source: Český statistický úřad 2020

On the other hand, the influx of cheap labour pushes down wages, affecting the domestic population's social situation and, consequently, the political scene. Another risk is the end of economic growth and the onset of the financial crisis, which belongs to regular market economy cycles. The labour demand will inevitably drop, which will make the immigrants rely on social support more. The overall ratio between working immigrants and immigrants relying on the social system is diverse, depending on the host country's situation and the immigrants' approach and qualification. However, the immigrants who are culturally closer to the host society (e.g. linguistically) have a greater chance of getting a job than immigrants from a significantly different cultural and linguistic environment. This has contributed considerably to the successful economic use of Ukrainian immigrants in the V4 countries (70% of all registered Ukrainians in the Czech Republic are employed) and thus to a more positive perception of Ukrainian migration than Mediterranean migration (e.g. only 38% of all registered Turks are employed) (Table 5). These Czech statistics serve as an example.

Another economic impact includes increased expenditure on integrating migrants and border protection in the EU and national budgets. The expenses for the detention of migrants in the territory of particular countries (e.g. Turkey) have to be taken into account. The migration question has caused much polarisation on the political scene and within society. The population's division into „welcomers and xenophobes” has increased tensions, accompanied by a lack of a constructive dialogue on migration. Migration has also raised the population's concerns about security due to terrorist attacks and criminal acts in Western Europe. Although there has been no terrorist attack in the V4 countries linked to the immigrants from the Mediterranean region, their image in the public's eyes has been damaged, and nationalist politicians used it (Naxera, Krčál 2018). Migration has also had positive effects on higher education in the V4 countries. Admission of Ukrainian students has begun at many universities, which has strengthened the student base and helped improve or even maintain particular fields of study and departments where domestic students have significantly dropped. These are mainly universities near the Ukrainian border. Another benefit, especially for employers, is connected with the low cost of the Ukrainian labour force.

V4 countries are usually perceived as more intolerant and xenophobic than Western Europe because of their uniform and totalitarian past. However, research by the Pew Research Center (2009) found that the conclusion is not so clear-cut. Western Europeans are more tolerant in their opinions towards different races, religions and cultures in theory, but citizens of V4 countries are more forgiving in the case of specific groups. Another research showed the change of opinions connected with Mediterranean migration. Immense scepticism towards receiving immigrants emerged in European Social Surveys, particularly in the case of Muslim immigrants, who comprise most Mediterranean migrants (Cichocki, Jabkowski 2019).

In 2015, 33% of Czechs, 31% of Slovaks, 57% of Poles and 64% of Hungarians⁹ thought that asylum-seekers should be redistributed more equally (Bernát et al. 2015). Politicians who tried to balance between Brussels requirements and majority voices in their countries have alienated the citizens by not fully respecting public opinion on the issues of Mediterranean migration, shifting the numbers of potential voters from standard political parties to non-standard parties that often offer anti-immigration political programme. The emergence of non-standard political parties in national parliaments complicates the formation of government coalitions since the attempts to ostracise these non-standard

9 Hungarians' higher level of support for redistribution is probably connected with many asylum applications in the country during the peak of the migration crisis.

political parties by the standard political parties are forced to form alliances over a broad political spectrum. The examples of non-standard political parties which have entered the Parliaments in the V4 countries are Jobbik (leader Gábor Vona), Freedom and Direct Democracy (Tomio Okamura), People's Party – Our Slovakia (Marián Kotleba), We Are Family (Boris Kollár). A similar development can also be seen in the countries of Western Europe: Alternative for Germany (Jörg Meuthen), Freedom Party of Austria (Heinz-Christian Strache), Five Star Movement (Luigi Di Maio), Northern League (Matteo Salvini), National Rally (Marie Le Pen), Finns Party (Jussi Halla-aho), etc. (see Table 6). The polarisation has also affected particular political parties, which can speed up political parties' fragmentation and the atomisation of the political scene. The shift towards criticism of the potential European quota system was observable even among standard political parties of the moderate right and left, afraid of losing likely voters.

Table 6: The results of Anti-immigration Political Parties in Two Previous Parliamentary Elections

Political Party	Last parliamentary elections (%)	Penultimate parliamentary elections (%)
Freedom Party of Austria (AT)	16,2	25,97
National Rally (FR)	21,53	17,9
Alternative for Germany (DE)	12,6	4,7
Freedom and Direct Democracy (CZ)	10,64	6,88
We Are Family (SK)	8,24	6,62
People's Party-Our Slovakia (SK)	7,97	8,04
Finns Party (FIN)	17,48	17,7
Five Star Movement (IT)	32,7	25,56
Northern League (IT)	17,3	4,09
Party for Freedom (NL)	13,1	10,08

Source: Authors

The side effect of Mediterranean migration, and in particular the efforts of Western European countries to enforce mandatory redistribution quotas, has brought about more intense cooperation among the V4 countries. This free group originated when the countries joined the EU and gradually lost its justification. It began their closer collaboration thanks to the joint opposition to mandatory quotas, despite having governments from the opposite political spectrum and some internal disputes between V4 countries. V4 made several joint statements in 2015 and 2016. The Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia recognised the dynamic and unpredictable security environment in

Europe, with growing threats in the EU's immediate neighborhood and beyond. They stressed the necessity of a balanced and inclusive approach to address challenges in both the Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods, emphasising the importance of EU unity and solidarity. They also examined the European Agenda on Migration and its mandatory quotas. While the V4 countries affirmed their proactive engagement in defining and implementing measures to address migration challenges, they also confirmed their ongoing contribution to joint EU actions. This commitment includes bolstering bilateral assistance and aid schemes, specifically emphasising countries of transit and origin like Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. Additionally, the V4 countries pledged to provide experts and technical equipment for entities such as Frontex and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (Pachocka 2016).

A Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán from the Fidesz party, who had a firm mandate from Hungarian voters on the domestic political scene and even managed to get Jobbik supporters on his side, became an informal V4 leader in the anti-immigration campaign. He said on Kossuth Radio in 2018 that "Brussels wants to take away the right of border protection from the member states" (V4NIEM 2019). Hungary built the fence on its southern borders and rejected asylum applications of migrants coming from the Balkan route, referring to Serbia as a safe country to apply for asylum. Fidesz prepared a media campaign against immigration, particularly of Muslims, promoting the protection of Hungary's population and traditions (Bauerová 2018). Slovakia (Prime Ministers Róbert Fico and Peter Pellegrini from the Smer-SD party) and Poland (Prime Ministers Beata Szydło and Mateusz Morawiecki from the Law and Justice party) more or less took the Hungarian side.

Among the V4 countries, Slovakia had the fewest long-term asylum applications among EU member states. Prime Minister Róbert Fico linked illegal migrants heading to the EU with the threat of terrorism and the potential Islamization of society. Redistribution of migrants became a politicised and securitised topic which was part of many debates and campaigns. During Slovakia's presidency in the Council of the EU, its government introduced an alternative solidarity immigration mechanism. The plan was based predominantly on the technical and financial assistance of EU members, depending on their individual preferences (Euractiv 2016). It was not successful. Poland, as a specific country with a crucial position of the Roman Catholic Church and its ties with the state, took religious belief into account in granting asylum. Prime Minister Beata Szydło openly rejected the quota system and pointed to the Polish reception of "a million refugees from Ukraine" (V4NIEM 2019). The Czech Republic has presented

diverse views, respecting the stance of the top political representatives (President Miloš Zeman, famous for his long-term strongly anti-Islamic opinions vehemently opposed immigration, Prime Ministers Bohuslav Sobotka from the Czech Social Democratic Party and Andrej Babiš from the ANO 2011 party have had a more moderate attitude) (Naxera, Krčál 2018). The people movement We Do Not Want Islam in the Czech Republic became visible and gained the support of 163 000 people on Facebook before the cancellation of its page by the social network.

The pressure of Western European countries on the V4 countries to accept mandatory quotas, intensified by threats of inducing the sanctions, has strengthened euro-scepticism in the V4 countries and significantly undermined the positive image of the EU there. It brought together governments of different political and ideological backgrounds. Fidesz is originally a liberal, national-conservative party, Smer-SD is a social-democratic party with nationalist ideas, Law and Justice is a right-wing national-conservative party with religious backing, and ANO 2011 is a populist catch-all party. The failure of the V4 countries in the vote on mandatory quotas was perceived as the „Brussels dictate”. As a result, the moods in favour of the disintegration of the EU have strengthened (Bauerová 2018). Also, the fact that the V4 group became more known and significant among citizens of its countries is remarkable (Nézöpont intézet 2018).

Integration of Mediterranean and Ukrainian migrants

The differences in the perceptions of the Mediterranean and Ukrainian migration in the V4 countries have three main reasons: the concerns about overburdening the social system, safety concerns and concerns about the nonintegrability of Mediterranean migrants. The worries about overburdening the social system arise from the fears that Mediterranean immigrants might find it challenging to integrate into society because of the differences in education, job qualifications and especially the language barrier. Moreover, they fear their birthrates (Pew Research Center 2017). These concerns are based on the experience of the “old” EU. Mediterranean immigrants can’t speak the languages of the V4 countries, and at the same time, the public in the V4 countries, especially the older generation, have limited foreign language skills. On the contrary, Ukrainian immigrants can succeed in the labour market due to their linguistic and cultural proximity. Moreover, Ukrainians speak Russian well and people older than 45 from the V4 countries know Russian from their education during socialism. Ukrainians’ values regarding democracy, human rights, and individual and religious freedom are very similar to those of EU citizens (Buhbe 2017).

Unemployment among Mediterranean migrants, despite generally low unemployment in their host countries, is very high (Higgins, Klitgaard 2019; Bevelander, Luik 2020; MacGregor 2021; OECD 2021). Obviously, there are differences based on the country of origin or gender (very high unemployment among women from traditional Islamic environment), as Bevelander and Luik (2020) show in the example of Sweden. The statistics show that the employment rates of non-EU migrants are highest in the V4 countries, where Ukrainians are the leading migrant group (OECD 2021).

A crucial and decisive criterion for different perceptions of the Mediterranean and Ukrainian migration is security issues. Mediterranean immigrants are also perceived as a potential security threat (Cichocki, Jabkowski 2019). The sense of security is critical to the population's comfort in their own country. The main motive for humanitarian refugees to leave their home country is also the absence of security. Movements of large numbers of predominantly men (Symon-Brown 2016) bring along some pathological social phenomena, such as criminality, or in specific cases Muslim religious radicalisation. Both Mediterranean and Ukrainian migrations have the same characteristics of criminal elements when criminals commit crimes in the host countries. However, the specific feature of Mediterranean migration is that it also brings ideological and religious violence. This violence is perceived as much more dangerous because it randomly attacks the population only based on their belonging or not belonging to the religion. Over time, Western Europe has been affected by violence on behalf of ideology (faith) (Nesser 2018). The most egregious examples were the terrorist attacks at the Bataclan Club in Paris in 2015, in Brussels in 2016 and at the Ariana Grande concert in Manchester in 2017, with a large number of victims. There were also many more minor terrorist acts and immigrant criminal violence (BBC 2017). Criminal delicts include honour killings, gang rapes, and female genital mutilation specific to immigrant communities. Muslim neighbourhoods functioning as separate organisms within European cities such as Molenbeek in Brussels or Rinkeby in Malmö also epitomise a problem (Miller et al. 2017). The separation of Muslim communities is often voluntary when these communities prefer ties with their countries above their homelands. Matters mentioned above are connected both to Muslims with EU citizenship and immigrants from the Mediterranean migration wave.

The population of Central Europe, which has experienced fascism and communism in the past century, is very sensitive to this phenomenon. The argument that only a small number of Muslims are terrorists is unsatisfactory. In the name of fascism and communism, crimes were committed only by

a small part of fascists and communists. The perception of Muslims in the V4 countries is the least favourable from the whole EU, and it is not only a matter of supporters of so-called populist political parties (Gorodzeisky, Semyonov 2019; Pew Research Center 2019). This sense of threat, brought about along the Mediterranean flow, is the main reason for its rejection among most people and political representatives in the V4 countries. Also, the general attitude in the V4 countries towards immigration seems negative (Hamid 2019). Nevertheless, the reception of Ukrainian economic migrants as well as refugees shows this attitude is not all-encompassing.

Another critical reason for divergent perceptions of Mediterranean migration and Ukrainian migration is the migrants' ability to integrate into society, seeing a huge difference. While the integration of Mediterranean migrants is failing (The Guardian 2020), the integration of Ukrainian migrants is going on without more significant problems. By not addressing the integration of Mediterranean migrants, the problem will be overwhelmed by worse effects over time. Integration is a complex process comprising many different levels, which is affected by several factors. Successful integration requires a positive attitude in a receiving society and immigrants' positive attitude towards integration. Integration of many Mediterranean immigrants is impossible in the V4 countries mainly due to society's resistance. The complexity of integration can also be seen in the results of the integration processes in Western Europe. Despite the positive attitude of the society, and institutional and financial opportunities, a large proportion of Mediterranean migrants have not been able to integrate so far.

There are barriers to be overcome, mainly among migrants who come from a predominantly Muslim environment. Their hierarchical understanding of religions (Islam is the completion of the Revelation of Judaism and Christianity and is therefore superior to these religions) causes a superior perception of their own culture and a reluctance to accept the culture of lower European society. Islam does not create subcultures through mixed marriages. When making a mixed marriage, usually in the model of a Muslim husband and a non-Muslim wife, the wife converts to Islam and does not create a mixed subculture where the two cultures blend evenly (Norris, Inglehart 2012). The absence of marriages where Islam would equally blend with European culture causes the lack of a bridge between Islamic and European society. Pew Research Center (2013) shows strong Islamic exceptionalism among the citizens of Afghanistan or Iraq who frequently migrate to Europe. It is evident from a high percentage of respondents supporting Sharia law or even suicidal bombing. The Middle Eastern and Northern African groups together tend to be the most culturally conservative and structurally disadvantaged in terms of integration and employment (Heath, Schneider 2021).

In some extreme cases, this rejection of the European culture may turn into violence and the isolation of Muslim communities from the local society. The issues of difficult integration of the Muslim community were also addressed by the senior representatives of Germany (Angela Merkel in 2010 – her famous speech: „And of course, the approach (to build) a multicultural (society) and to live side-by-side and to enjoy each other... has failed, utterly failed.” *The Guardian* 2010) and France (Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidential campaign resonated with immigrant issues). Migrants from the Mediterranean area, where Islam is a dominant religion, are not accustomed to a democratic society. As Islamic countries are dominated by authoritarian regimes (the republics led by dictators or the monarchies with feudal relations), migrants from these countries bring their political and social thoughts into the host countries, which is further enhanced by an intense religiosity that greatly affects all aspects of both social and personal life. The V4 countries have shown interest in welcoming Iraqi Christians who have faced persecution in Iraq and have cultural preconditions for easier integration in host countries.

One of the reasons it is said so little about Ukrainian immigration is that this integration into society is performed relatively smoothly. Almost all Ukrainians in the V4 countries are either working or studying, so they have taken serious steps towards integrating into the community with no side requirements¹⁰. Cultural, linguistic and religious proximity allows the integration of Ukrainian immigrants into everyday life. The only significant difference is the adoption of the Julian calendar, which causes a shift in celebrating Christmas and New Year’s holidays. However, it is widespread that Ukrainian immigrants celebrate these holidays twice. In the case of Ukrainian immigrants, we can talk about integration and, in some cases, even assimilation. Especially in mixed marriages, the children feel like citizens and the nation’s members of the receiving country. However, generally said, the socialising of Ukrainians with the majority is still limited (Drbohlav, Seidlová 2016).

Comparison of migration crisis concepts in the V4 countries and Western European countries

The major differences in addressing the migration crisis by representatives of Western European countries and the V4 countries are based on entirely different concepts. The Western European countries wanted to integrate immigrants into the EU and redistribute them across all EU countries using mandatory quotas.

¹⁰ However, sometimes there are problems with male workers accommodated in hostels who are prone to alcoholism and committing minor offenses (Pluhař 2018).

Nowadays, they want to establish more voluntary mechanisms, but the talks about quotas or their equivalents still emerge. The V4 countries proposed strengthening the protection of the EU's external borders and building detention centres for immigrants outside EU. The V4 countries were politically weaker than the Western European countries and were voted down in key votes within the EU institutions. Despite this, the V4 countries' proposals have lately proven to be more realistic, and the outcomes of the latest events (the European Council summit focused on migration in Brussels on 28 July 2018) aim to build centres for migrants outside the EU, improve the external border protection and abolish mandatory quotas for the redistribution of migrants. The very idea of quotas for migrant redistribution suggests that Mediterranean migration does not epitomise a positive phenomenon and economic opportunity for the ageing European population, as European institutions representatives like to say (e.g. CoE – Parliamentary Assembly 2017).

This effort to weaken the adverse effects of migration by dispersing it into a larger territory and thus reduce tensions in the most affected areas has proved controversial. First, this decision induced resistance in the countries affected by Mediterranean migration only minimally. These were the V4 countries that were not the destination countries for Mediterranean migrants and do not have a colonial history or any linkages to them. The call for solidarity from the European Commission officials was not accepted, and the effort to enforce migration quotas by voting procedure ended in court (Slovakia and Hungary filed a lawsuit against the European Commission, later joined by Poland, which was not successful). The V4 countries offered their assistance to countries affected by migration flows in a different form. The main argument of the opponents of mandatory migration quotas was the concern that they would not work because migrants are not interested in staying in poorer countries. After redistribution, they will move to economically more vital countries¹¹. The threats of the possible suspension of the subsidies only strengthened Eurosceptic tendencies in the V4 countries and enabled the rise of anti-immigration politicians. Some of the parliamentary parties in the V4 countries included the withdrawal from the EU into the party's political programme (the Freedom and Direct Democracy – SPD in the Czech Republic, Kotleba-People's Party – Our Slovakia in Slovakia).

The controversy of mandatory migration quotas can be seen mainly in a divergent approach to Mediterranean immigration and Ukrainian immigration. The V4 countries, which received large numbers of immigrants from Ukraine (1 300 000 in Poland), have become subject to sanctions because of not accepting a few

11 Günther Oettinger, Eurocomissioner for digital economy and society, proposed as a solution unified European asylum system with unified social benefits (Euroskop 2016).

thousand Mediterranean migrants. The question arises as to why immigrants from Ukraine do not fall under mandatory quotas for the V4 countries. Considering the partly ongoing war conflict in the East of Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk Regions) and the Russian annexation of Crimea, the Ukrainians or at least part of them should be addressed as war refugees, unlike Mediterranean migrants from countries, where there is no war conflict.

If the European Commission wants to redistribute only those migrants who are more difficult to integrate because of their culture or religion, we can discuss discrimination. The status of all immigrants coming from countries or regions with ongoing war conflicts should be the same. The number of immigrants in the V4 countries would even outstrip the proposed mandatory quotas. If the Mediterranean migration is so disadvantageous, it is questionable whether it was necessary to force member states to accept migrants and pay them for it or sanction them if they refuse. Why should the component of the immigration flow that does not migrate for humanitarian reasons but for economic reasons be supported? Despite frequent proclamations of being refugees and applying for asylum, The Mediterranean migration flow probably comprises more economic migrants than humanitarian refugees, which is also seen from the migrants' efforts not to stay in the first safe country (what is usually the aim of humanitarian refugees) but to migrate to economically wealthier countries or from migrants-refugees travelling to their home countries (Salameh 2017). Moreover, many migrants do not have any documents and a large portion of them falsely claim they are from Syria (al-Jazeera 2015). It is also dubious that Mediterranean migration is significantly dominated by adult men (Symon-Brown 2016, Brücker et al. 2019). Many migrants arriving in the EU were not from countries suffering from armed conflict or war regions but from countries such as Albania, Eritrea, Pakistan, Nigeria, Iran, Turkey, Guinea, and Bangladesh (Karolewski, Benedikter 2018; UNHCR 2020). It is worth adding that most regions of Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan were under government control and safe in terms of the MENA countries.

Conclusions

Our findings, especially in chapter 5, supported our central hypothesis from the introduction of the text. Culturally and linguistically close migrants integrate more easily into a host society, especially in the first generation. This finding determines differences in the impacts of the Mediterranean and Ukrainian migration on the V4 countries on social and political levels. Nowadays, their integration is an important political topic. The securitisation of an immigrant question in a broad sense, containing terrorism, criminality and

religious incompatibility, became a strong theme in the public discourse of V4 countries (see chapter 4), which do not share the same opinion of other policies, and partly in Western Europe, which faced several harmful acts connected to Mediterranean migration.

It strengthened nationalist political parties that agreed with the V4 attitude towards mass migration. An example of how standard political parties can prevent the victory of the Eurosceptic and nationalist parties could be seen in the Austrian parliamentary elections 2017. Sebastian Kurz from the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) succeeded in defeating Heinz-Christian Strache from the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) through the transition towards conservative immigration policy, which helped them win the voters of the Freedom Party of Austria back to their side. Only half a year before, the pre-election estimates predicted the victory of the Freedom Party of Austria. The second alternative could be seen in the Italian parliamentary elections 2018, where standard political parties could not revise their immigration policy and suffered a heavy defeat. That is why the Eurosceptical Five Star Movement (M5S) and the Northern League (LN) have come to power, exacerbating controversy in the EU in the coming years. The migration crisis created an ad hoc geopolitical bloc from V4 countries. We have illustrated that, while the V4 maintained a steadfast resistance to relocation, the perspectives of Germany and other European nations underwent notable changes, ultimately influencing the evolution of the European Commission's stance.

If we leave aside the rise of the national conservative politicians in the "old" EU, on the basis of geopolitical neorealism, we can divide European into states into three categories regarding immigration (Parkes 2015):

- Countries without direct borders encountering non-EU migration through airports and seaports (Germany, France) – they are the economic core of Europe and welcome migrants who are able and willing to work. They do not care about the sole movement of people but terrorism and criminality.
- Countries with extensive external sea borders (Italy, Spain, Greece) – they often perceive immigration as a security threat as they witness illegal crossing of external EU borders. In their viewpoint, mass migration is fundamentally an external process that poses a challenge to controlling the state's territory. In response, they prioritise reinforcing the physical security of borders.
- Countries with substantial external land borders (Hungary, Poland) exhibit distinct geopolitical circumstances influencing their government's perception of mass migration – they also often perceive immigration as a security threat for the same reasons as the above-mentioned group. Clearly, Poland and Hungary

have a vested interest in implementing any mechanism to enhance solidarity in safeguarding the external land border, including the equitable distribution of burdens. These countries are more of a semiperiphery. They do not need immigration so much, so they prioritise security.

This division does not fully explain the position of the Czech Republic and Slovakia on migration. Migration has consistently been both a catalyst and a tool in the competition among various geopolitical blocs within the EU. Traditionally, this rivalry occurred between Europe's northern and southern regions based on the differences mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, the 2004 enlargement opened the door for Central Europe to become actively involved. The V4 countries, grounded in interests and pragmatism, found multiple incentives in recent years to collectively pursue their interests at the European level. Through the lens of neorealist geopolitics, extensive external land borders at the periphery of the Schengen zone, particularly in the case of Poland and Hungary, leads to the view of migration as a security threat linked to border security. In contrast, core European states have more optimistic perspectives on migration, seeing the movement of labour as a beneficial phenomenon since they are destination countries. Consequently, the level of securitisation is considerably lower for them. The migration crisis also unfolded as an arena for internal contention among various European geopolitical blocs. Notably, the novelty in the current situation lies not in migration becoming a subject of political rivalry, but rather in Central Europe emerging as a player.

Primarily, the economic crisis, coupled with debates on the future of integration and Brexit, left the EU deeply divided, presenting an opportunity for the V4 countries to enhance their influence. Secondly, the new voting system introduced by the Lisbon Treaty reduced the institutional power of the V4 states, preventing them from forming a blocking minority. Migration essentially became a tool for them to amplify their influence. According to the neorealist perspective, the distribution of power shapes international relations, and conflicts arise from shifts in the balance between states. While the V4 countries lack the material resources to challenge the leadership of Germany or France, the migration crisis significantly boosts their bargaining power (Szalai, Csornai, Galai 2017).

Migration is a complex process that brings some positives and negatives and cannot be addressed by just one effective solution. It is, therefore, necessary to approach particular migration flows and the subsequent integration of the immigrants individually according to the immigrants' structure and the nature of the host country. Issuing regulations from a distant centre (Brussels) without knowing or respecting reality in specific regions is condemned to failure. Successful

integration of immigrants usually requires their cultural closeness to the host country's nature and the host society's awareness of the fact that they are helpful to them. That creates good two-way feedback. This is also confirmed by an almost seamless integration of Ukrainian immigrants in the V4 countries. Successful integration of immigrants leads to a positive perception among the public. When we first looked at why the large migration flow from Ukraine is outside the media coverage, the people and the political parties, the answer is that it does not create any significant problems in the host society, need long-term special treatment and therefore does not attract any attention.

Ukrainian migration to the V4 countries is a real phenomenon. Meanwhile, Mediterranean migration to the states V4 is marginal, and it is perceived primarily through information from Western Europe and the EU's proposals. Considering the current situation, we assume that the political stabilisation of the situation in Ukraine will take a longer time, at least several years. The country's subsequent social and economic renewal will require a further period expecting continuous migration flows from Ukraine in the following years. Similarly, the Mediterranean migration flows can continue, with estimated fluctuations in their intensity, depending on the situation in home countries, third countries involved in migration diplomacy and regulatory measures in European countries. Once the migrants settle down in their destination countries, we expect a successful integration of Ukrainian immigrants in the V4 countries.

In the case of Mediterranean migrants, it is not likely that they will fully adapt to the host country. The Muslim population in the EU is expected to rise and influence more and more public sphere. Its political influence is questionable. In many countries, the Muslim community has reached 5% of the host country's population (in most countries, 5% is the electoral threshold – a minimum percentage of votes to enter the parliament). Nevertheless, Muslim political parties exist in Western Europe but are successful only on municipal or regional levels. Maybe it is because a large portion of the Muslim population is under a voting age, or there is not unity among the Muslim population coming from various countries and cultures.

The intensity of future Mediterranean migration to Europe may further deepen the society's polarisation and strengthen nationalist and Eurosceptic parties on the political scene. If the Eurosceptic parties are about to win in further European countries, either the complete disintegration of the EU may be expected, or the shift from the concept of the EU superstate into a free economic union of independent countries may emerge. The development of the V4 countries, which are not attractive to Mediterranean immigrants, will significantly depend on the

political agreements on the immigrants' redistribution with Western European countries. If this redistribution is forced into practice in the V4 countries, it is understandable that the Eurosceptic political parties will strengthen in the region. If they form government coalitions, their policy will exacerbate conflicts between the V4 and Western European countries. The opposite alternative is promoting a less liberal approach to immigration in Western Europe (which is already happening in Austria, Italy, and Bavaria), which brings the attitudes of the V4 countries and the Western European countries closer together. The perspective of Germany and France will be essential.

Literature

- al-Jazeera (2015). Germany: Refugees are falsely claiming to be Syrian. Accessed 29 Aug 2020. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/9/25/germany-refugees-are-falsely-claiming-to-be-syrian>.
- Apalkova, V., Lyzunova, A. (2019). External labor migration from Ukraine: causes, scale, consequences. *European Journal of Management Issues*, 27(1-2), 3-9.
- Bauerová, H. (2018). Migration Policy of the V4 in the Context of Migration Crisis. *Politics in Central Europe*, 14(2), 99-120.
- BBC (2017). Reality Check: Are migrants driving crime in Germany? Accessed 29 Dec 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45419466>.
- Bernát, A. et al. (2015). *Attitudes towards refugees, asylum seekers and migrants*. Budapest: TÁRKI Social Research Institute.
- Bevelander, P., Luik, M.-A. (2020). Refugee Employment Integration Heterogeneity in Sweden: Evidence From a Cohort Analysis. *Frontiers in Sociology*, 5.
- Bisztrai, M., Kovács, E., Kováts, A., Vadasi, V. (2020). *Perpetual temporariness: situation of migrant workers in Hungary*. Budapest: FES.
- Borbeau, P. (2011). *The securitisation of migration. A study of movement and order*. London: Routledge.
- Brader, T., Valentino, N. A., Suhay, E. (2008). What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(4), 959-978.
- Braun, M. (2019). Postfunctionalism, Identity and the Visegrad Group. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 58(4), 925-940.
- Brücker, H. et al. (2019). Language skills and employment rate of refugees in Germany improving with time. *DIW Weekly Report*, 9(4/6), 49-61.
- Buhbe, M. (ed.) (2017). *How Ukrainians Perceive European Values: Main Results of an Empirical Survey*. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Campesi, G. (2018). Crisis, migration and the consolidation of the EU border control regime. *International Journal of Migration and Border Studies*, 4(3), 196-221.

Cesarz, M. (2019). Carriers' liability in the European Union in the era of migration and the refugee crisis. *Pogranicze. Polish Borderlands Studies*, 7(1), 7-24.

Český statistický úřad (2019). Cizinci v České republice 2016. Accessed 15 Aug 2020. <https://www.czso.cz/documents/10180/91605941/29002719.pdf/74e31838-8cfa-4e93-9aed-4771e13683a8?version=1.0>.

Český statistický úřad (2020). Data – počet cizinců. Accessed 27 Dec 2020. https://www.czso.cz/csu/cizinci/4-ciz_pocet_cizincu.

Cichocki, P., Jabkowski, P. (2019). Immigration Attitudes in the Wake of the 2015 Migration Crisis in the Visegrád Group Countries: Comparative insights of ESS7 and ESS8. *Intersections EEJSP*, 5(1), 27-47.

CoE – Parliamentary Assembly (2017). Migration as an opportunity for European development. Accessed 23 Dec 2020. <https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XXRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=23745&lang=en>.

de Haas, D. (2010). Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective. *International Migration Review*, 44(1), 227-264.

Dietz, B. (2010). Migration from Ukraine: A challenge for the European Union? In Baganha M. I., Marques J. C., Góis P. (eds.). *Imigração Ucrainiana em Portugal e no sul da Europa: a emergência de uma ou várias comunidades?* Lisbon: Alto-Comissariado para a imigração e Diálogo Intercultural.

Drbohlav, D., Jaroszewicz, M. (2016). Introductory remarks. In Drbohlav, D., Jaroszewicz, M. (eds.). *Ukrainian Migration in Times of Crisis: Forced and Labour Mobility*. Prague: Charles University.

Drbohlav, D., Seidlová, M. (2016). Current Ukrainian migration to Czechia – Refuge for economic migrants rather than for refugees. In Drbohlav, D., Jaroszewicz, M. (eds.). *Ukrainian Migration in Times of Crisis: Forced and Labour Mobility*. Prague: Charles University.

Duszczuk, M., Podgórska, K., Pszczółkowska, D. (2019). From mandatory to voluntary. Impact of V4 on the EU relocation scheme. *European Politics and Society*, 1-18. EASO (2015). Annual report on the situation of asylum in the European Union 2014. Accessed 31 Dec 2020. <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/a601d4c1-11d4-4c72-9164-1a4df89162b0/language-en>

Euractiv (2016). Migrácia: slovenský návrh „efektívnej solidarity“ nepresvedčil. Accessed 29 Dec 2020. <https://euractiv.sk/section/zahranicie-a-bezpecnost/news/migracia-slovensky-navrh-efektivnej-solidarity-nepresvedcil>.

Euroskop (2016). Oettinger: Země EU by měly harmonizovat azylové právo. Accessed 26 Dec 2020. <https://euroskop.cz/2016/08/10/oettinger-zeme-eu-by-mely-harmonizovat-azylove-pravo>.

Eurostat (2020). Fertility Statistics. Accessed 7 June 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Fertility_statistics#live_births_per_woman_in_the_EU_in_2019.

Fedyuk, O., Kindler, M. (2016). Migration of Ukrainians to the European Union: Background and Key Issues. In Fedyuk, O., Kindler, M. (eds.). *Ukrainian Migration to the European Union. Lessons from Migration Studies*. Cham: Springer.

- Fiala, P., Krutílek, O., Pitrová, M. (2018). *Evropská unie*. Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury.
- Freeman, G. P. (2006). National Models, Policy Types, and the Politics of Immigration in Liberal Democracies. *West European Politics*, 29(2), 227-247.
- Gorodzeisky, A., Semyonov, M. (2019). Unwelcome Immigrants: Sources of Opposition to Different Immigrant Groups Among Europeans. *Front. Sociol., Sec. Sociological Theory*, 4, 1-10.
- Gruszczak, A. (2017). European Borders in Turbulent Times: The Case of the Central Mediterranean 'Extended Borderland'. *Politeja*, 14(5), 23-44.
- Hamid, S. (2019). *The role of Islam in European populism: How refugee flows and fear of Muslims drive right-wing support*. Washington: Brookings Institution.
- Harper, J. (2018). Poland fears economic hit as EU opens doors to Ukrainians. DW. Accessed 18 Jun 2018. <https://www.dw.com/en/poland-fears-economic-hit-as-eu-opens-door-to-ukrainians/a-42367764>.
- Heath, A. F., Schneider, S. L. (2021). Dimensions of Migrant Integration in Western Europe. *Frontiers in Sociology*, 6.
- Higgins, M., Klitgaard, T. (2019). How Has Germany's Economy Been Affected by the Recent Surge in Immigration? Liberty Street Economics. Accessed 14 Mar 2020. <https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2019/05/how-has-germanys-economy-been-affected-by-the-recent-surge-in-immigration>.
- Hollifield, J. F. (1992). Migration and International Relations: Cooperation and Control in the European Community. *International Migration Review*, 26(2), 568-595.
- Janusek-Krysińska, N., Majewski, M. (2016). Integracja muzułmanów i kryzys migracyjny jako wyzwania dla niemieckiej i europejskiej dyplomacji. *Pogranicze. Polish Borderlands Studies*, 4(1), 93-121.
- Karolewski, I., Benedikter, R. (2018). Europe's refugee and migrant crisis: Political responses to asymmetrical pressures. *Politique européenne*, 60(2), 98-132.
- Kymlicka, W. (2018). Liberal Multiculturalism as a Political Theory of State-Minority Relations. *Political Theory*, 46(1), 81-91.
- Letavajová, S., Divinský, B. (2019). *Common Home: Migration and Development in Slovakia*. Bratislava: Caritas Slovakia.
- Lendel, M. (2016). Migration of Ukrainians to Central European countries in the context of the Postmaidan internal and international crisis. *Public Policy and Administration*, 15(4), 549-563.
- MacGregor, M. (2021). Germany: Two-thirds of Syrian refugees unable to support themselves. Infomigrants. Accessed 17 Jun 2020. <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/33597/germany-two-thirds-of-syrian-refugees-unable-to-support-themselves>.
- Mearsheimer, J. (2014). *The Tragedy of World Politics*. New York: Norton.
- Miller, D., Chtouris, S., Bivens, N. D., Davis Bivens, Nyjeer, W., Fraction, D. (2017). Fostering Community-Based Resilience in Zones of Exclusion: Irregular Migration and National Security at the Forefront of Global Protection Against

Human-Induced Terrorist Disasters. *Journal of Applied Security Research*, 12(1), 179-195.

Naxera, V., Krčál, P. (2018). "This is a Controlled Invasion": The Czech President Miloš Zeman's Populist Perception of Islam and Immigration. *Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics*, 12(2), 192-215.

Nič, M. (2016). The Visegrád Group in the EU: 2016 as a Turning-point? *European View*, 15(2), 281-290.

Nesser, P. (2018). *Islamist Terrorism in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nézöpont intézet (2018). Visegrad Cooperation 2018. Increasing Support, Optimism and Trust. Accessed 17 Mar 2019. <http://nezopontintezet.hu/v4poll/en>.

Norris, P., Inglehart, R. F. (2012). Muslim Integration into Western Cultures: Between Origins and Destinations. *Political Studies*, 60(2), 228-251.

OECD (2021). Foreign-born unemployment (indicator). Accessed 20 Dec 2021. <https://data.oecd.org/migration/foreign-born-unemployment.htm>.

Pachocka, M. (2016). Understanding the Visegrad Group States' Response to the Migrant and Refugee Crises 2014+ in the European Union. *Yearbook of Polish Studies*, 19, 101-132.

Pallister-Wilkins, P. (2016). Interrogating the Mediterranean 'Migration Crisis'. *Mediterranean Politics*, 21(2), 311-315.

Panebianco, S. (2016). The Mediterranean migration crisis: border control versus humanitarian approaches. *Global Affairs*, 2(4), 441-445.

Parkes, R. (2015). European Union and the Geopolitics of Migration. Ulpaper, Swedish Institute of International Affairs. Accessed 20 Dec 2021. <http://www.ui.se/eng/upl/files/111585.pdf>.

Pew Research Center (2009). Two Decades After the Wall's Fall. End of Communism Cheered but Now with More Reservations. Accessed 14 Jun 2019. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2009/11/Pew-Research-Center_Two-Decades-After-the-Walls-Fall-End-of-Communism-Cheered-But-Now-With-More-Reservations_2009.pdf

Pew Research Center (2013). The World's Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society. Pew Research Religion & Public Life Project. Accessed 17 Jul 2020. <http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-overview>.

Pew Research Center (2017). Europe's Growing Muslim Population. Accessed 17 Jul 2020. <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population>.

Pew Research Center (2019). European Public Opinion Thirty Years after the Fall of Communism. Minority groups. Accessed 17 Jul 2020. <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/10/14/minority-groups>.

Pluhař, A. (2018). Ubytovny plní dělníci z ciziny, obyvatelé malých měst se jich obávají. *Idnes.cz*. Accessed 27 June 2019. https://www.idnes.cz/liberec/zpravy/ubytovny-delnici-cizina-obyvatele-mala-mesta-obavy-strach.A180423_150022_liberec-zpravy_jape.

- Průcha, J. (2010). *Interkulturní psychologie: sociopsychologické zkoumání kultur, etnik, ras a národů*. Praha: Portál.
- Reuters (2016). Czechs to return Iraqi Christians who tried to move to Germany, interior minister says. Accessed 7 Aug 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-migrants-czech-iraqis-idUSKCN0X00HB>.
- Salameh, K. (2017). Do refugees travel to their home countries on vacation? Accessed 27 Dec 2020. <https://www.dw.com/en/do-refugees-travel-to-their-home-countries-on-vacation/a-40443562>.
- Soltész, B. (ed.) (2021). *The role of local governments in the integration of refugees in the V4 countries*. Prague, Bratislava, Warsaw, Budapest: People in Need, Marginal, Institute of Public Affairs, Menedék.
- Schyhelska, H., Kryskov, A., Chop, T. (2019). Ukrainian Labor Migration: Main Trends and Risks. In Marynenko, N., Kumar, P., Kramar, I. (eds.). *Business Risk in Changing Dynamics of Global Village 2*. Nysa: Publishing House of University of Applied Sciences in Nysa.
- State Statistics Service Ukraine (2017). Population of Ukraine 2016. Demographic Yearbook, Kyiv. Accessed 8 Aug 2018. http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2017/naselen_2016.pdf.
- Statistics Times (2020). List of European countries by GDP per capita. Accessed 27 Feb 2020. http://statisticstimes.com/economy/european-countries-by-gdp-per-capita.php?fbclid=IwAR0qLomrBE7cDwUvfKKuIgQRKX_NSntSalAiRXJhbBkvaw9iXk284wVO0rY.
- Strielkowski, W., Sanderson, M. (2013). Structural channels for Ukrainian labour migration in the Czech Republic. *Trames*, 17(2), 313-323.
- Symon-Brown, S. (2016). European migrant crisis causing dangerous gender imbalance in region, expert warns. Accessed 25 Dec 2020. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-01-11/european-migrant-crisis-triggers-gender-imbalance/7076924>.
- Szalai, M., Csornai, Z., Galai, N. (2017). *V4 Migration: Conflicting Narratives and Interpretative Frameworks*. Barcelona: CIDOB.
- The Guardian (2010). Angela Merkel: German multiculturalism has 'utterly failed'. Accessed 30 Dec 2020. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism-failed>.
- The Guardian (2020). Violent extremism linked to failure of migrants to integrate, EU says. Accessed 29 Nov 2020. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/13/violent-extremism-migrants-failure-to-integrate-eu>.
- The World Bank (2019). Population, total – Ukraine. Accessed 15 February 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2019&fbclid=IwAR2mXoZaU4gdGyPsGz7MWuveynRjazWrzS-68-oBQpbdwU9nRAS5lPs8VX8&locations=UA&start=1993>.
- Torelli, S. M. (2018). Migration through the Mediterranean: mapping the EU response. European Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed 4 Aug 2018. http://www.ecfr.eu/specials/mapping_migration.

UN (2013). International Migration Policies: Government Views and Priorities. Accessed 30 Nov 2020. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/InternationalMigrationPolicies2013/Report%20PDFs/z_International%20Migration%20Policies%20Full%20Report.pdf.

UNHCR (2015). Ukraine: Internally Displaced People – 30 January 2015. Accessed 8 Dec 2018. <http://maps.unhcr.org/en/view?id=2652>.

UNHCR (2018). UNHCR Statistics – The World in Numbers. Accessed 9 Sep 2018. http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview#_ga=2.20552056.1755568829.1529565443-1789850643.1529565443.

UNHCR (2020): Refugee Data Finder. Accessed 20 Dec 2020. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=WQzq12>.

Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców (2020). Cudzoziemcy w Polsce po 2020 r. Accessed 18 Mar 2022. <https://www.gov.pl/web/udsc/cudzoziemcy-w-polsce-po-2020-r>.

V4NIEM (2019). Asylum Seekers and Beneficiaries of International Protection in V4 Countries (Updated Report). Accessed 29 Dec 2020. <https://reliefweb.int/report/czechia/asylum-seekers-and-beneficiaries-international-protection-v4-countries-updated-report>.

Van Hear, N., Bakewell, O., Long, K. (2017). Push-pull plus: reconsidering the drivers of migration. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 44(6), 927-944.

Van Mol, C., Snel, E., Hemmerechts, K., Timmerman, C. (2018). Migration aspirations and migration cultures: A case study of Ukrainian migration towards the European Union. *Population, Space and Place*, 24(5), 1-11.

Visegrad Group (2021). Calendar of selected events. Accessed 26 Dec 2021 <https://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar>.

Weir, F. (2015). Ukrainian refugees in Russia: Did Moscow fumble a valuable resource? *The Christian Science Monitor*. Accessed 8 Aug 2018. <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2015/1201/Ukrainian-refugees-in-Russia-Did-Moscow-fumble-a-valuable-resource>.

Zimmermann, H. (2021). Neorealism. In: Riddervold, M., Trondal, J., Newsome, A. (eds.). *The Palgrave Handbook of EU Crises*. *Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Zogata-Kusz, A. (2012). Theoretical Perspectives on Immigration Policy and Politics. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 7(1), 5-21.



© 2024 by the Authors. Published by University of Opole. This work is an open access article licensed and distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License (CC-BY-NC-SA).